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Rationalising International Law Rules on 
Self-Defence: The Pin-Prick Doctrine 
 
Abhimanyu George Jain*  
 
Abstract 
 
The pin-prick doctrine permits defensive uses of force in response 
to a continuing pattern of attacks providing objective proof of a 
future threat. It provides a necessary, possible and appropriate 
means of rationalising international law rules regulating the use 
of military force in self-defence. Recognition of the pin-prick 
doctrine in international law is necessary as a part of a broader 
exercise to rationalise international law rules on self-defence. 
The collective security system envisaged under the UN Charter 
has failed, leading to jus ad bellum rules that are unduly 
restrictive in the face of real and severe threats to the security of 
states. Thus, rationalisation is necessary to maintain the integrity 
of the system. Further, recognition of the pin-prick doctrine in 
international law is possible because it already enjoys 
widespread support in state and judicial practice. Moreover, 
recognition of the pin-prick doctrine in international law is 
appropriate because unlike other doctrines designed to 
rationalise Charter rules on self-defence (such as pre-emptive 
self-defence), the pin-prick doctrine does not unduly compromise 
the effectiveness of the Charter regime.   
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RATIONALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
RULES ON SELF-DEFENCE: THE PIN-
PRICK DOCTRINE 
 
Abhimanyu George Jain 
 
Introduction 	  
 In the first major national security speech of his second 
term in office, President Obama referred to the need to 
“dismantle networks that pose a direct danger, and make it less 
likely for new groups to gain a foothold.”1 Referring to the 
pattern of terrorist attacks leading up to 9/11, President Obama 
said, “left unchecked, these threats can grow.”2 This was just one 
element of a broader counter-terrorism strategy enunciated by 
President Obama, but these explicit references to checking and 
eliminating terrorist threats before they develop resonates with 
the pre-emptive self-defence doctrines expressed by former 
President Bush. Both President Obama and President Bush have 
in common the character of a response to future threats, as well as 
that of presenting issues of compatibility with strict 
interpretations of the international law rules on use of force. This 
paper argues that there is a space for, indeed even a need for such 
doctrines. The argument presented in this paper is not geared 
towards sacrificing international law rules on use of force at the 
altar of national security, but instead at rationalising these rules to 
appropriately balance national and international security.  
 Consider the following hypothetical. A state, Fornjot, is 
the victim of a suicide bombing by Janus, a terrorist organisation 
operating from the territory of Telesto, another state.3 Janus has 
previously undertaken such attacks against Fornjot and has 
declared its intent to continue doing so. Fornjot knows of the 
location of Janus’ camps in Telesto.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  President Barack Obama’s Speech at National Defense University-full text, 
THE GUARDIAN, May 23, 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/23/obama-drones-guantanamo-
speech-text. 
2 Id. 
3 About Saturn & Its Moons, NASA, http://saturn.ipl.nasa.gov/science/moons 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014) (Fornjot, Telesto and Janus are fictional entities 
whose names are inspired by the names of the moons of Saturn).   
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 Fornjot, and the international community at large, have 
repeatedly urged Telesto to take action against Janus’ operations 
on its territory, but Telesto appears either unwilling or unable to 
cooperate. Fornjot executes an aerial attack against Janus’ camps 
in Telesto. Is Fornjot’s use of force a legal exercise of the right of 
self-defence under Art. 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter 
(UN Charter)? 
 Fornjot’s use of force in these circumstances would 
definitely appear to be reasonable. International law rules 
regulating a state’s ability to resort to the ‘military instrument’4 
are not, after all, meant to be a ‘suicide pact’.5 Nonetheless the 
legality of Fornjot’s actions may be challenged on the grounds 
that a single suicide bombing does not meet the gravity threshold 
for defensive use of force, or on the grounds that as a delayed 
response Fornjot’s actions constituted an illegal reprisal rather 
than legal self-defence. These challenges are based on a strict 
interpretation of international law rules relating to self-defence, 
but this interpretation and these challenges are not without 
support.6  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-
Cold War World: Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in LAW AND FORCE IN 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 26, 29 (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David 
Scheffer eds., 1991) [hereinafter Reisman].  
5 Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During 
Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 231, 231, n. 1 (1991) (quoting 
Jeane Kirkpatrick, former U.S. ambassador to the UN).  
6 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194, ¶ 139 (Jul. 9) 
[hereinafter Wall Opinion] (dismissing arguments relating to self-defence 
because the impugned actions of Israel were directed against a non-state actor); 
Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories 
of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 997 (2001) (arguing that 
widespread support for American use of force against Afghanistan after 9/11 
may not imply an automatic deviation from the formerly strict interpretation of 
the right of self-defence. Several publicists note that states do sometimes use 
force in the manner described here, but express their reservations as to the 
effect of recognising this permissibility of such uses of force upon the 
effectiveness of jus ad bellum.); JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 146-7 (2004) 
[hereinafter GARDAM] (arguing that use of force in this situation would not be 
consistent with international law); Dino Kritsiotis, The Legality of the 1993 US 
Missile Strike on Iraq and the Right of Self-Defence in International Law, 45 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 162, 174-7 (1996) [hereinafter Kritsiotis]; Tom Ruys, Quo 
Vadit Jus Ad Bellum?: A Legal Analysis of Turkey’s Military Operations 
Against the PKK in Northern Iraq, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 334, 363-64 (2008); 
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 Referring to precisely the kind of situation discussed in 
the example, Reisman suggested that states could not really be 
faulted for their defiance of Charter rules.7 That assessment is 
correct- uses of force in the circumstances outlined above, should 
be permissible.  
 The defensive use of force in this sort of situation may be 
justified by reference to the ‘pin-prick’ or ‘accumulation of 
events’ doctrine. This doctrine recognises the existence of a right 
of self-defence in response to a series of armed attacks, each 
possibly falling below the gravity threshold, but together, 
constituting a continuing armed attack which meets the gravity 
threshold, and supports exercise of the right of self-defence in 
anticipation of a future threat, in order to deter that threat. This 
paper argues in favour of the recognition of this ‘pin-prick’ 
doctrine because it provides a much needed rationalisation of jus 
ad bellum rules without leaving states free to use force at will.  
 The argument is presented in three parts. Section II 
discusses the need for rationalisation of international law rules 
relating to the use of force: strict limits on states’ ability to use 
force are desirable but not at the cost of state security interests.  
Section III outlines how, in the face of situations similar to that 
faced by Fornjot above, states have relied on the pin-prick 
doctrine to use and justify defensive force, a doctrine which also 
finds support in the decisions of international courts. Finally, 
Section IV fleshes out the substance and details of the pin-prick 
doctrine and argues that it is capable of rationalising jus ad 
bellum rules without unduly weakening the Charter regime.  
 The pin-prick doctrine is not a panacea for all complaints 
about the rigidity of Charter rules on self-defence. 
Notwithstanding the potential recognition of the pin-prick 
doctrine, situations of the sort discussed here – where states are 
constrained in defending themselves by inflexible rules - will 
continue to arise. A powerful example of this is situations where 
pre-emptive rights of self-defence are invoked. This paper does 
not argue that pre-emptive self-defence should be recognised 
because to do so presents credible and insurmountable threats to 
the integrity of jus ad bellum rules. However, situations may well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
359, 367-72, 390 (2002) [hereinafter Tams] (documenting authority for a strict 
interpretation of the right of self-defence prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks).  
7 Reisman, supra note 5, at 34.  
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arise where pre-emptive uses of self-defence would be both 
legitimate and reasonable, if illegal. Thus, the argument here does 
not pretend to provide an easy or complete fix for the problems 
facing the international law rules of self-defence. Instead it 
focuses on the pin-prick doctrine as a suitable and appropriate 
way to begin that exercise.  
 
I. The Charter Right To Self-Defence and Its Flaws 
  
 fThis section argues that international law rules relating to 
self-defence are unduly restrictive in practice. First, the 
international law of self-defence is briefly outlined [Section 
II(A)] and then its restrictiveness in practice is considered. 
[Section II(B)].  
 
A. The Right to Self-Defence 
  
 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use or threat 
of force.8 The UN Charter is the first international legal 
instrument to comprehensively prohibit recourse to armed force.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”) See generally, THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 200 (Bruno Simma et al eds., 3rd ed., 
2012) [hereinafter Simma] (providing an interpretive guide to art. 2 ¶ 4); 
NIKOLAS STÜRCHLER, THE THREAT OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) 
(discussing the meaning of ‘threat of force’).   
9 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. I, Aug. 27, 1928, 
94 L.N.T.S. 57 (listing the signatory countries: the U.S.A., Australia, 
Dominion of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Great Britain, India, Free 
Irish State, Italy, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. Unfortunately, 
the treaty, though well intentioned, suffered from several flaws. For instance, 
though it outlawed ‘war’, it made no reference to uses of force short of war, 
thereby presumably leaving open the possibility of such uses of force.); J.L. 
Brierly, Some Implications of the Pact of Paris, 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 208, 
208 (1929); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 82-4 
(5th ed., 2012) [hereinafter DINSTEIN] (arguing that the first ever such truly 
international attempt was the Covenant of the League of Nations. But that 
stopped short of being a comprehensive and effective prohibition of the use of 
force for various reasons, including the requirement of unanimity in the 
Council or majority in the Assembly to restrict states, exclusivity of state 
competence in matters within their individual jurisdiction, and restricted scope 
of application to disputes between members. Another such attempt was the 
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There are only two exceptions to this blanket prohibition: 
enforcement action under Chapter VII and self-defence under 
Art. 51.   
 Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) finds a threat to international peace and security 
under Art. 39,10 it may authorise the use of military force 
pursuant to Art. 42.11 The enforceability of UNSC-mandated uses 
of force is assured by the combined effort of Art. 25,12 which 
requires states to cooperate with UNSC decisions, and Art. 103,13 
which provides for the prevalence of obligations under the UN 
Charter over other international law obligations.14 The UNSC has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kellogg-Briand Pact.); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 
(1st ed., 1952) (making no references to uses of force in self-defence, the treaty 
generated controversy as to whether self-defence was permitted); C.H.M. 
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, in 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 471-474 (1952). 
10 U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security”); See generally, Simma, supra note 9, at 1272. 
11 U.N. Charter art. 42 (“Should the Security Council consider that measures 
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action 
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces of Members of the United Nations”); See generally, Simma, supra note 
9, at 1330. 
12 U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the 
present Charter”); See generally, Simma, supra note 9, at 787. 
13 U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail”); See generally, Simma, supra note 9, at 2110. 
14 Joy Gordon, The Sword of Damocles: Revisiting the Question of Whether the 
United Nations Is Bound by International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 605, 607-8 
(2012) (regarding the binding effect of Chapter VII resolutions of the UNSC); 
Rain Livoja, The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations 
Charter, 57 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 585 (2008); See generally Gráinne de 
Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After 
Kadi, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (criticising the pluralist approach of the 
decision. This guaranteed enforceability suffered a setback in 2005 through the 
2008 decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the 
Kadi case. The Kadi case involved a challenge to European Union measures 
implemented pursuant to UNSC Chapter VII resolution requiring, inter alia, 
the freezing of assets of suspected terrorists. The challenge was instituted by a 
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invoked its Chapter VII powers to set up international courts,15 
enforce arms embargoes16 and no-fly zones,17 demand cessation 
of hostilities,18 authorise collective military action,19 and even 
invoke the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).20  
 The right of self-defence under Art. 5121 of the UN 
Charter has several important aspects. A brief summary is 
provided below.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Saudi national whose assets had been frozen; he argued that he had been 
denied notice and judicial review. The CJEU, expressly ruling that it was 
considering a challenge to the EU measure, and not the UNSC resolutions, 
upheld the challenge under the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Though this decision does not judge the merits of the actions of the UNSC, it 
does effectively open the door to EU states being prevented from fulfilling 
their obligations under UNSC Chapter VII resolutions if those resolution 
contravene fundamental intra-EU obligations.); Juliane Kokott and Christoph 
Sobotta, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – 
Finding the Balance?, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1015 (2012) (supporting the Kadi 
case decision).  
15 S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)); S.C. Res. 
955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)). See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
28-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (challenging 
and upholding the authority of the UNSC to establish an international criminal 
tribunal, and consequently the validity of the  jurisdiction exercised by the 
ICTY, was challenged and upheld in the very first case considered by that 
court).. 
16 S.C. Res. 713, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (Sep. 25, 1991) (imposing an arms 
embargo upon the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 418, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977) (imposing an arms embargo upon South Africa).  
17 S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 6-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Feb. 26, 2011) (imposing a 
no-fly zone over Libya).  
18 Id., at ¶ 1-3.  
19 S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorising use 
of force against Iraq during the first Gulf War); S.C. Res. 929, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/929 (Jun. 22, 1994) (authorising member states to participate in and 
cooperate with the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda). 
20 S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the 
situation in Sudan to the International Criminal Court).  
21 U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
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 First, the UN Charter does not create the right to use force 
in self-defence. It recognises a pre-existing right. This is 
indicated by the phrase: “Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs…” There is heated debate about the 
meaning of the reference to “inherent right.” Some 
commentators have suggested that this supports a broader right of 
self-defence than that supported by the text of Art. 51.22 Others 
disagree. In practice, however, most states tend to justify the 
legality of their uses of force in self-defence by reference to the 
text of Art. 51.23 By and large, however, the Charter right of self-
defence is believed to be narrower than the customary 
international law right, that existed before 1945.24  
 Second, the right of self-defence arises only in response to 
an armed attack. However, it is unclear what exactly constitutes 
an armed attack.25 It is commonly accepted that not all uses of 
force constitute an armed attack. There is a certain gravity 
threshold below which uses of force are not armed attacks for the 
purpose of Art. 51.26 It is unclear what exactly is the quantitative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security”); See generally Simma, 
supra note 9, at 1397. 
22 E.g., D. W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185-6 (1958); 
Stephen M. Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern 
International Law, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 411, 463 (1972). Another 
interesting example of such an argument is IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 255-7 (1963) [hereinafter BROWNLIE] 
(arguing that Art. 51 refers to a pre-existing customary international law right, 
but unlike the other authors cited in this footnote, believes that the text of Art. 
51 codifies the pre-Charter right, and does not thus support a broader right of 
self-defence than that supported by the text of Art. 51).  
23 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 118 
(Malcolm Evans et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2008) [hereinafter GRAY]. 
24 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-2 (1950); OSCAR 
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 147-50 (1991) 
[hereinafter SCHACHTER]; DINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 191-3.  
25 See generally, TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN 
CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE (2010) 
(discussing the various aspects of the concept of ‘armed attack’)  
26 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101, ¶ 191 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (“[i]t will 
be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those 
constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms”); Case Concerning 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 187, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6) 
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dividing line provided by the gravity threshold.27 Whether a 
particular use of force meets this requirement is usually a 
determination based on facts guided by a few bright line 
examples. For instance, an invasion by a regular army is an 
armed attack,28 as is invasion by irregular forces equivalent to an 
invasion by regular forces,29 but mere support of rebel forces in 
the form of finance or logistics or arms, is not, 30 and nor are mere 
‘frontier incidents’.31   
 Third, and related to the question of armed attack, is the 
temporal aspect of self-defence. A strict textual interpretation of 
Art. 51 would indicate that the right of self-defence is only 
available in response to an on-going attack or in response to a 
declaration of intent to attack even though the attack has not 
started.32 Indeed, many commentators restrict the scope of Art. 51 
to this responsive or interceptive right of self-defence.33 A more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Judgment) [hereinafter Iranian Oil Platforms] (quoting and approving the 
above statement from Nicaragua. This requirement predates the ICJ’s 
judgment in Nicaragua, even though that is the most famous expression of the 
rule); E.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 366 (“[T]he use of force must attain a 
certain gravity”); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex art. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (“The first use of armed force by a State in 
contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of 
aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, 
conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed 
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including 
the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient 
gravity”).   
27 BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 366. 
28 GRAY, supra note 24, at 128.  
29 Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 103, ¶ 195.  
30 Id. 
31 BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 366. 
32 Examples of the latter would include an army massed on the other side of a 
border waiting to attack, or the approach of a hostile naval fleet or aerial 
squadron.  
33 GRAY, supra note 24, at 160: “The majority of states reject anticipatory self-
defence.”; BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 367-8 ("In all probability the question 
which should be posed is not when is anticipatory action justified but, when 
has an attack occurred?...Preparations for attack can only be countered by 
preparations to resist effectively, and, in general, activities which do not affect 
the territorial domain of a state, including its airspace and territorial waters, do 
not justify forcible measures of defence. Thus, if an unexplained force of 
warships or aircraft approached a state via the high seas and the superjacent 
airspace, this will constitute a threat to the peace but, it is submitted, does not 
of itself justify forcible measures of self-defence since there is no resort to 
force by the putative aggressor and there is no unequivocal intention to attack . 
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controversial question is that of anticipatory self-defence, that is, 
the use of defensive force in response to an attack that is certain 
but has not been initiated.34 Even more controversial is the 
question of pre-emptive self-defence - defensive use of force 
based on a fear of future attack.35 Pre-emptive self-defence is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
. . a naval force of a state which had stated its intention to attack, approaching 
territorial waters, might be regarded as offensive and intercepted on the high 
seas. The dangers of permitting defensive action outside the territorial 
domain—even in exceptional cases such as the approach of rockets—may be 
minimized if the proportionality principle is observed and some distinction 
made between interception and defence on the one hand and retaliation on the 
other. The whole problem is rendered incredibly delicate by the existence of 
long-range missiles ready for use: the difference between attack and imminent 
attack may now be negligible." (citation omitted) 
34 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. (June 27), 14, 337, ¶ 173 (dissenting opinion by Judge 
Schwebel) [hereinafter Nicaragua – Schwebel] (“I do not agree with a 
construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it 
were worded: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if, and only if, an armed attack occurs.’”); 
U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility- 
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 188, 
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UNSG’s Panel Report] (“[A] 
threatened state, according to long established international law, can take 
military action so long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means 
would deflect it and the action is proportionate.”); Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal 
Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, 37 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 269, 302 (1961); David A. Sadoff, A Question of 
Determinacy: The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 523 (2009) (arguing that anticipatory self-defence is increasingly finding 
recognition in state practice); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use 
Armed Force, 82, MICH. L.R. 1620, 1634 (1984) (“[T]here may be situations in 
which the imminence of an attack is so clear and the danger so great that 
defensive action is essential for self-preservation.”).  
35 THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002) (“We must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives pf today’s 
adversaries . . . The United States has long maintained the option of 
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling 
the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent 
such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
pre-emptively.”); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive 
Use of Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89 (2003) [hereinafter Arend] (arguing that though 
international law doesn’t recognise pre-emptive self-defence, it should); W. 
Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of 
Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525 (2006) [hereinafter 
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distinct from anticipatory self-defence in three ways: first, it is 
temporally more distant; second, and consequently, it involves a 
lower probability of actual attack because of the possibility of 
intervening events;36 third, anticipatory self-defence enjoys more 
support in state practice and the writings of eminent publicists.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Armstrong and Reisman] (relating primarily to terrorist threats); Abraham D. 
Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-Emption, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 209 (2003); 
William H. Taft, IV, The Legal Basis of Preemption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (2002), http://www.cfr.org/international-law/legal-basis-
preemption/p5250.  
36 The difference between anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence is well 
illustrated by comparing the 1987 USS Vincennes and the 1981 Israeli attack 
on the Iraqi Osirak reactor. The USS Vincennes was an unfortunate incident in 
which an Iranian civil aircraft drifted over an American naval vessel engaged 
in hostilities with Iranian naval vessels and was shot down. The then American 
Vice-President George H.W. Bush made the following statement to the UNSC, 
U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council 1985-8 - Chapter XI, at 432, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. ( 
 
"One thing is clear - that the USS Vincennes acted in self-defence. 
This tragic accident occurred against a backdrop of repeated, 
unjustified, unprovoked and unlawful Iranian attacks against United 
States merchant shipping and armed forces, beginning with the mine 
attack on the USS Bridgeton in July 1987. It occurred in the midst of 
a naval attack initiated by Iranian vessels against a neutral vessel and 
subsequently against the Vincennes when she came to the aid of the 
innocent ship in distress. Despite these hostilities, Iranian authorities 
failed to divert Iran Air 655 from the combat area. They allowed a 
civilian aircraft loaded with passengers to proceed on a path over a 
warship engaged in active battle. That was irresponsible and a tragic 
error...The information available to Captain Rogers, the captain of the 
Vincennes, indicated than an Iranian military aircraft was 
approaching his ship with hostile intentions. After seven - I want the 
Council to be sure to understand this - seven unanswered warnings, 
the captain did what he did what he had to do to protect his ship and 
the lives of the crew. As a military commander, his first duty and 
responsibility is to protect his men and his ship, and he did so. The 
wild allegation by the Iran side that the attack on the airliner was 
premeditated is offensive and absurd." This is an example of 
anticipatory self-defence, where use of force was exercised in 
anticipation of an imminent threat. Consider in contrast the 
justification offered by Israel for its strike against the Osirak nuclear 
reactor in Iraq, 1981 U.N.Y.B. 275-7 (“Israel, on 8 June, transmitted 
to the Council President and to the Secretary-General a special 
announcement of the same date by its Government, stating that a raid 
by the Israel air Force had destroyed the “Osirak” (Tamuz-1) reactor 
and that all aircraft had returned safely to base. Israel had learnt that 
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 Fourth, there is a requirement that any defensive use of 
force be necessary and proportionate.37 This requirement is not 
stated in the text of Art. 51 but has been recognised as a part of 
the pre-existing customary international law right of self-
defence38 and has continued to be read into Art. 51.39 As with the 
gravity requirement, these standards are not very precise and are 
often subject to determination, depending upon the factual 
context. It seems clear, however, that the necessity requirement 
refers, at the very least, to the availability of alternative effective 
responses, and incorporates practical elements such as futility of 
non-forceful responses or approaching the UNSC, immediacy of 
response, etc. 40 In particular, the requirement of immediacy as an 
element of necessity of defensive use of force, draws a line 
between uses of force in self-defence, which have a protective 
character and armed reprisals which are motivated by vengeance 
or deterrence.41 Proportionality relates to the quantity and manner 
of force used in relation to the provocative use of force.42  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the reactor was designed to produce atomic bombs whose target 
would have been Israel, as the ruler of Iraq had announced after an 
Iranian raid which had slightly damaged the reactor. Under no 
circumstances would Israel allow an enemy to develop weapons of 
mass destruction against it . . . in removing a nuclear threat to its 
existence, Israel had exercised its legitimate right of self-defence...in 
destroying the "Osirak" nuclear reactor, it had performed an act of 
self-preservation and exercised its inherent right of self-defence. A 
threat of nuclear obliteration was being developed against Israel by 
Iraq, which had declared itself in a state of war with Israel since 1948 
and had rejected all United Nations efforts for peaceful settlement of 
the Arab-Israel dispute . . . Within weeks "Osirak" would have gone 
"hot", after which time any attack on it would have blanketed 
Baghdad with lethal radioactive fall-out.”) 
 
37 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 245, ¶ 41 (July 8); Iranian Oil Platforms, supra note 27, at 161, ¶ 
43; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 147 (Dec. 19) 
[hereinafter Armed Activities]. 
38 Robert Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 86 
(1938) (deriving from the famous Caroline standard which conditioned the use 
of force in self-defence upon the “necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”).   
39 GRAY, supra note 24, at 148.  
40 GARDAM, supra note 7, at 147-55.  
41 Oscar Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 291, 292 (1985); GARDAM, supra note 7, at 150. 
42 GARDAM, supra note 7, at 155-86. 
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 Finally, Art. 51 also refers to the requirement of reporting 
defensive uses of force to the UNSC,43 to the lapse of the right to 
self-defence under Art. 51 upon action by the UNSC,44 and to the 
possibility of collective self-defence.45 But these need not be 
discussed in greater detail here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 105, ¶ 200 (using failure to report defensive 
uses of force as an indication that the U.S.A. (the state which claimed to be 
using force in self-defence) did not believe that it was acting in self-defence); 
GRAY, supra note 23, at 121 (arguing that since then states have been much 
more regular in reporting defensive uses of force); See generally D.W. Greig, 
Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Require?, 40 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 366 (1991).  
44 Richard N. Gardner, Commentary on the Law of Self-Defense, in LAW AND 
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 49, 50 (Lori Fisler Damrosch and 
David Scheffer eds., 1991); Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defence 
once the Security Council Takes Action, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 229 (1996); 
Eugene Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defence?, 
85 AM. J. INT’L L. 506 (1991) (Given the political nature of the UNSC, this 
question has obviously generated a large amount of controversy. Does the fact 
that the matter has been reported to the UNSC satisfy this requirement? Or 
should the UNSC be discussing the issue? Or should it have taken some 
action? Or should that action have had some effect? Or should that action 
satisfy the concerns of the potentially defending state? The prevailing view is 
that so long as there continues to be an armed attack that would justify use of 
force in self-defence, irrespective of the UNSC having taken cognisance of the 
issue, the right of self-defence continues).   
45 Here again there are at least two different points of view. One position is 
that the right to collective self-defence can only be invoked by states that are 
simultaneous victims of the same armed attack or series of armed attacks. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 
Dissenting Opinion by Judge Sir Robert Jennings, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 545 (June 
27) [hereinafter Nicaragua – Jennings]. The opposite position is that any state 
that is the victim of an armed attack may request a third state for assistance and 
that third state would be able to invoke the right to collective self-defence. 
This is the prevailing opinion and was endorsed in Nicaragua, supra note 27, 
103-4, ¶ 195. It was also one of the justifications invoked by the U.S.A. and 
other states in the first Gulf War. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the 
Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 452, 457-61 (1991). Within this prevailing 
opinion there arises the question of when the assistance of a third state may be 
said to have been invoked. In Nicaragua, the ICJ required an explicit request 
for assistance to invoke this right. Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 105, ¶ 199. The 
court’s imposition of a high threshold for the invocation of this right was 
motivated by the fear of its misuse. Indeed history demonstrates several 
colourable instances of collective self-defence claims. For instance, American 
and British military assistance to Lebanon and Jordan in response to threats 
and uses of force by the United Arab Republic, allegedly under the right of 
collective self-defence elicited suspicion from the Soviet and Arab blocs. See, 
U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
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B. Self-Defence in Practice 
  
 In practice the Charter rules on self-defence have proven 
excessively restrictive. Four aspects stand out in particular: (1) 
the use of force by non-state actors (“NSAs”); (2) the gravity 
requirement; (3) the necessity requirement; and (4) the temporal 
aspect of self-defence.  
 First is the use of force by NSAs. In practice, the bulk of 
armed attacks force have originated from NSAs, operating from 
the territories of states unwilling or unable to prevent them. The 
problem of indirect aggression, which was acknowledged as a 
serious concern in the Nicaragua judgment,46 has been 
challenging the Charter regime since its inception.47 For example, 
in 1958, NSAs allegedly supported by the United Arab Republic 
undertook an organised campaign to destabilise and overthrow 
the governments of Lebanon and Jordan.48 Another such example 
is the Israeli Entebbe raid,49 where Israeli use of force against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Security Council 1956-8 - Chapter XI, at 175, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
46 Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 103, ¶ 195; Nicaragua – Schwebel, supra note 
35, at 349; Nicaragua – Jennings, supra note 46, at 543-44; John Norton 
Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 60 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 
FOREIGN AFF. 901, 919 (1985-1986).  
47 The Chinese delegate in the course of the UNSC debate on the situation in 
Lebanon in 1958 remarked that in the present period of world history, 
“indirect aggression is as dangerous as direct aggression." U.N. Dep't of Pol. 
& Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 
1956-58 – Ch. XI, at 176, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml 
(emphasis added).  
48 At the request of the threatened governments, American and British forces 
intervened militarily. For an overview of the UNSC debate on this situation, 
see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of 
the Security Council 1956-58 – Ch. XI, at 175-76, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. The debate in the UNSC 
revolved heavily around the strict requirement of direct aggression and armed 
attack and several states condemned the British and American actions as 
contrary to the UN Charter. See, e.g., the statements of USSR and Sweden, 
ibid.  
49 In 1976, terrorists attacked a French civilian aircraft and forced it to land in 
Entebbe, in Uganda. The terrorists demanded the release of certain Palestinian 
terrorists in exchange for the safe release of the aircraft and its passengers. It 
was suspected that the Ugandan government and its then leader – President Idi 
Amin – were complicit in the actions of the terrorists. The Israeli armed forces 
undertook a daring military operation, landing in Entebbe, overpowering the 
terrorists and Ugandan armed forces present on the scene and liberating the 
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terrorists was criticised for violating Ugandan territorial 
integrity.50 Israel and the U.S.A. have regularly been conducting 
military strikes against NSAs on the territories of other states and 
have been criticised heavily.51 This situation also featured 
prominently in a series of International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
cases between the Democratic Republic of Congo and its 
neighbours in the early 2000s.52 The most significant, most 
contemporary example of this is that of modern terrorist 
organisations. 
 The use of force against NSAs is in itself relatively 
uncontroversial, but very often the use of force against NSAs 
entails use of force against the state from whose territory the 
NSA operates. Until recently, force could be non-controversially 
used against the host state only if the conduct of the NSA could 
be attributed to the host state.53 This is complicated by the 
evidentiary difficulties of defining the relationship between the 
host state and the NSA.54 Post-9/11 there seems to be greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
hostages. For an overview of the UNSC debate regarding this incident, see 
1976 U.N.Y.B., Part 1, Sec. 1, Ch. XV, at 317-19.  
50 See statements from Kenya, Qatar, the Arab Group, Benin, China, Cuba, 
Guinea, Mauritius, Romania, USSR, Tanzania and Guyana in 1976 U.N.Y.B., 
Part 1, Sec. 1, Ch. XV, at 317-19. Israel argued that the Ugandan government 
was cooperating with the terrorists. Letter Dated 4 July 1976 from the 
Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/12123, at 2-3 (Jul. 5, 1976); 1976 U.N.Y.B., 
Part 1, Sec. 1, Ch. XV, at 317 ("[W]hen the airbus landed at Entebbe airport on 
28 June, in accordance with a previously prepared plan, the hijackers had been 
met by a reinforcement of heavily armed terrorists who were awaiting them at 
the terminal. President Amin arrived at the airport shortly before the hijacked 
aeroplane landed; when it did, he embraced the hijackers in a gesture of 
welcome and a promise of support and assistance. Ugandan soldiers were then 
positioned with their guns trained not on the hijackers but on the innocent 
civilians - men, women and children."). 
51 Infra notes 76-82, 85-91 and accompanying text.  
52 Those cases involved uses of force by Congo’s neighbours in violation of its 
territorial sovereignty. The respondent states alleged that their uses of force 
were directed against NSAs which were attacking them from bases located on 
Congolese territory. Armed Activities, supra note 37.  
53 Nicaragua, supra note 26, at 103, ¶ 195; Tams, supra note 7, at 368.  
54 The question of proof has derailed many cases relating to the use of force at 
the ICJ. In several cases before the ICJ relating to use of force, claims of self-
defence have failed on the grounds of evidentiary inadequacies. E.g., Iranian 
Oil Platforms, supra note 26, at 194-96, ¶¶ 71-72. These concerns are 
especially significant in relation to attributing the conduct of NSAs to state. 
E.g., Armed Activities, supra note 37, at 223, ¶ 146. 
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acceptance of the need for strong defensive rights against NSAs 
notwithstanding their connection to a state,55 and the 
unwillingness or inability of the territorial state to act against the 
NSA justifies defensive use of force.56  
 However, the threshold for legitimate use of force against 
states is much higher than that for NSAs. There is no threshold 
for use of force against NSAs if no other state is affected.57 But 
for use of force against states, the use of force must be 
‘necessary’ and that requires, inter alia, enhanced requirements 
regarding immediacy of response and exhaustion of peaceful 
remedies.58 Thus, the rules of jus ad bellum inadvertently shield 
and protect NSAs.  
 Second is the gravity requirement. While there is a very 
strong justification for its existence, the gravity requirement 
operates as a legal loophole that allows states and NSAs to use 
force with impunity. As a result several states have justified 
defensive uses of force as responses to series of attacks and 
repeated provocation. This characterisation is the crux of the pin-
prick doctrine and shall be discussed in greater detail infra.59  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 2005 I.C. J. 
Reports 2005, at 313-14, ¶¶ 26-29 (Dec. 19) (“[I]f the attacks by the irregulars 
would . . . have had to be classified as an armed attack had they been carried 
out by regular armed forces, there is nothing in the language of Article 51 of 
the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising its inherent right of 
self-defence"); Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, 
2005 I.C. J. Reports 2005, at 337, ¶ 11 (Dec. 19) (“[L]arge-scale attacks by 
non-State actors can qualify as ‘armed attacks’ within the meaning of Article 
51."); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: 
An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 63-70 (2005). 
56 Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework 
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012) (defining 
parameters for invocation of this framework). This ‘unable or unwilling’ 
language was also used in the American support for the Israeli raid on Entebbe 
during the UNSC debate: “[T]here was a well-established right to use limited 
force for the protection of one's own nationals from an imminent threat of 
injury or death in a situation where the State in whose territory they were 
located was either unwilling or unable to protect them." 1976 U.N.Y.B.,  Part 
I, Sec. I, Ch. XV, at 319 (emphasis added). 
57 At most, rules of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law would be implicated but these would affect the manner of use of 
force, not the right to use force itself.  
58 Supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.  
59 Infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.  
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 Third is the necessity requirement – in particular the 
requirement of immediacy of response. Conventional armed 
conflict between military forces is now the exception rather than 
the norm. For the most part, threats to security today take the 
form of isolated incidents. Strict interpretation of the immediacy 
requirement would render the right to self-defence a hollow shell. 
This would be even truer in the case of terrorist attacks where 
identifying the responsible organisation and people might take 
time. Strict interpretation of the immediacy requirement has the 
effect of leaving states with two options: (1) prevention; or, (2) 
reliance on the collective security system. This obviously makes 
states uncomfortable.60  
 A fourth problem relates to the temporal aspect of self-
defence. There is a justifiable apprehension on the part of states 
to strictly observe the temporal requirements of Art. 51 when 
doing so would involve preventable losses on their part. The USS 
Vincennes incident discussed above provides an excellent 
example of this limitation.61  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 An interesting example of an immediacy-based challenge to an allegedly 
defensive use of force is provided by the American use of force against Iraqi 
intelligence agencies following a failed attempt by the Iraqi government to 
assassinate then ex-President George H.W. Bush. The American government 
invoked the pin-prick doctrine to defend its actions and referred to the time 
required to exhaust peaceful alternatives and to conclusively establish 
responsibility. State opinion on the legality of the strike was divided. U.N. 
Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council 1993-95 – Ch. XI, at 1148, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. On the 1993 strike, see 
generally Dino Kritsiotis, supra note 7; Similarly, Israeli strikes against 
terrorist training facilities in neighbouring countries have often been criticised 
on the basis of the immediacy requirement. Infra notes 85-91 and 
accompanying text. The UNSG’s High-Level Panel has endorsed a strict 
interpretation of the immediacy requirement. UNSG’s Panel Report, supra 
note 34, at 63.   
61 Supra note 36. The American action came under heavy criticism from 
several states. U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council 1985-88 – Ch. XI, at 432, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. Another example of this 
limitation is the 1989 ‘incident involving the downing of Libyan 
reconnaissance aircraft’. The U.S.A. described the incident as follows:  
 
"The facts in the case are clear. The incident took place on 4 January. 
The aircraft carrier Kennedy was on an easterly transit through the 
Mediterranean Sea 170 miles north of the border between Libya and 
Egypt. The United States Navy aircraft were operating on a training 
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 Thus, in practice, strict interpretation of the Art. 51 right 
has the potential to tie the hands of states in the face of legitimate 
security threats. But that does not mean that restraints on the right 
to self-defence should be discarded. Necessity, immediacy, 
gravity and temporal connection are essential to prevent recourse 
to coercive force as an element of state policy. But just as jus ad 
bellum should not leave states able to use force at will, it should 
not leave states unable to use force to protect themselves when 
necessary. The interpretation of these doctrines must be relaxed 
in light of contemporary international relations to allow states to 
adequately defend themselves. The need for such relaxation is 
particularly acute because the original strict interpretation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mission in international airspace, over international waters, some 70 
miles off the coast of Libya, north of Tobruk. Operations of this 
nature have been conducted in the same area many times in the past - 
in fact, 12 times over the Past year. These operations past and present 
pose no threat to Libya or other countries. During these operations 
armed Libyan fighter aircraft were detected by the United States 
forces as the Libyan aircraft left their home base at the Al Bumbah 
airfield in eastern Libya. The Libyan aircraft were tracked for 10 
minutes as they closed rapidly on the two American F-14 planes. Our 
pilots did not react precipitately rather they exercised restraint under 
very tense circumstances. They did not fire immediately. Instead they 
repeatedly attempted to avoid the Libyan aircraft which were closing 
on them. In order to determine the intent of the Libyan fighters and to 
demonstrate lack of hostile intent on their part, the United States 
pilots on five separate occasions altered their direction. They also 
changed their speed and their altitude. Still the Libyan aircraft 
continued to close and to track our aircraft in a hostile manner 
markedly different from previous sorties by Libyan aircraft to monitor 
our training operations. In the face of this repeated hostile behaviour 
by the Libyan planes, the United States section leader was faced with 
a growing and imminent threat of being shot down by the intercepting 
Libyan aircraft. We have photographic evidence that clearly shows 
the Libyan aircraft were carrying air-to-air missiles. At a distance of 
approximately 14 miles, with only a few seconds to take a decision, 
as the Libyan planes closed at a very high rate of speed, the United 
States section leader determined that his aircraft were in jeopardy. 
The United States aircraft then fired on the Libyan planes, shooting 
down two Libyan aircraft in a clear and unambiguous act of' self-
defence."  
  
U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2835th mtg. at 14-16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2835 (Jan. 5, 
1989). 
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these doctrines was motivated by reliance on a UNSC-led 
collective security system, which has failed to materialise.62  
 The push for doctrinal development in the Charter rules 
on self-defence is evident in the emergence of the ‘unwilling or 
unable’ test discussed above,63 as also efforts to develop a 
doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence.64 Another such doctrine is 
the pin-prick doctrine.65  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Nicaragua – Jennings, supra note 45, at 544 (“[A]n essential element in the 
Charter design is totally missing. In this situation it seems dangerous to define 
unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence, so as to leave a 
large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the 
United Nations employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is 
absent.").The UNSG’s high-level panel urged continued reliance on the 
UNSC, but this seems more like a prescription lex feranda than a statement de 
lege lata.). UNSG Panel’s Report, supra note 34, at 55, ¶¶ 190-91 (“[I]f there 
are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to 
support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize 
such action if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by 
definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, 
deterrence and containment - and to visit again the military option. For those 
impatient with such a response, the answer must be that, in a world full of 
perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-
intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the 
legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed 
action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow all.”). 
63 Supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.   
64 Supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
65 These developments are not restricted to jus ad bellum alone. Similar 
debates are taking place in the context of jus in bello as well as traditional 
rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) designed to cater to inter-state 
conflict are being challenged in the course of the global war on terror. A 
particularly interesting example is that of civilian manufacturers of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). Under IHL generally, civilians may be targeted only 
insofar as and for so long as they directly participate in hostilities. Under the 
IHL rules relating to international armed conflicts civilians working in 
ammunition factories to manufacture ammunition are not considered to be 
directly participating in hostilities and are therefore not targetable. By analogy, 
civilian manufacturers of IEDs should not be legitimate military targets either. 
But the proximity of such civilians to the scene of battle and the fluid 
functional distinction between civilians manufacturing and deploying IEDs 
makes this a difficult rule to enforce in practice. For further discussion of this 
particular example compare Nils Melzer, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009); Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between 
Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 831, 868 (2010); with Michael N. Schmitt, 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: the Constitutive Elements, 
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 Thus, there are two objectives here which are in tension 
with each other. One is the need to rationalise Charter rules on 
self-defence to allow states to protect their interests. The other is 
the need to prevent obliteration of the Charter regime on use of 
force at the hands of unbridled, allegedly defensive uses of force. 
Both of these objectives must be balanced in assessing any such 
doctrine. A number of publicists who have recognised the pin-
prick doctrine in state practice and academic literature have 
stopped short of endorsing it because of the fear that it might 
diminish the effectiveness of jus ad bellum.66 The validity of this 
concern will be discussed later,67 but for now it is sufficient to 
note that the rationale for recognising the pin-prick doctrine in jus 
ad bellum de lege feranda lies in rationalising jus ad bellum de 
lege lata and the primary criterion for integration is that the 
effectiveness of jus ad bellum as a stringent restriction be 
maintained. 
 It is possible to argue against the rationalisation of 
international law rules relating to use of force. Three arguments 
may be made in support of this proposition. First, that reform 
attempts may weaken the Charter regime68 or lead to its collapse. 
Second, that given the difficulties of building consensus around 
new rules and the risk of loss of restrictiveness it is preferable to 
retain the current rules notwithstanding their imperfections, and 
to assess exceptions and violations on a case by case basis. 
Proponents of this argument point to the fact that when the need 
to use force is particularly acute, the Charter regime and the 
international community have proved sympathetic.69 Third, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: a Critical 
Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5 (2010). For discussion of challenges to IHL, 
see generally ANDREA BIANCHI AND YASMIN NAQVI, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM (2011).  
66 Kritsiotis, supra note 7, at 174-7; Tams, supra note 7, at 390; Ruys, supra 
note 6, at 363-64.  
67 Infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
68 Some reform proposals explicitly envisage a more restricted role for the UN 
in collective security. John C. Yoo and Will Trachman, Less Than Bargained 
for: The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 379 (2005).  
69 Thomas M. Franck, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS 
AND ARMED ATTACKS 184 (2002) (“The preceding chapters have sought to 
demonstrate that international law is gradually emulating national legal 
systems in developing, around its codex of strict rules, a penumbra of 
reasonableness.” Franck makes a wonderfully persuasive argument drawing 
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notwithstanding vociferous complaints and abuses regarding the 
inadequacies of the Charter regime, that regime survives70 and 
seems to retain its relevance in the assessment and justification by 
states of uses of force71 - their own as well as those of others.72  
 These are sound arguments, but ultimately unsatisfactory, 
for the following reasons. First, and in response to the first 
argument above, fear of deterioration is never a good reason for 
rejecting the possibility of reform. More importantly, with regard 
to the second reason above, rule of law cannot be ad hoc. It must 
be based in clear rules; we must be reluctant to “leave such 
defense to a decision contra legem”.73 Finally, with regard to the 
third reason above, the divergence between doctrine and practice 
reasonably evokes questions as to the integrity and legitimacy of 
jus ad bellum.74 International law, more so than municipal law, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particularly on the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo which was by and 
large recognised as illegal but legitimate. With regard to the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, several other publicists have concluded that the 
intervention in the absence of UNSC authorisation was a positive one-time 
event, but an undesirable normative shift. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and 
the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). Similarly, the 
American military response to 9/11 was uniformly endorsed by states despite 
being at odds with the UN Charter rules. Infra note 82and accompanying text.   
70 Rosalyn Higgins, International Trade Law and the Avoidance, Containment 
and Resolution of Disputes: General Course on Public International Law, 230 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 315 (1991) (“[T]here have been countless abusive 
claims of the right to self-defence. That does not lead us to say that there 
should be no right of self-defence today . . . We delude ourselves if we think 
that the role of norms is to remove the possibility of abusive claims ever being 
made.” 
71 GRAY, supra note 24, at 118 (noting that states try to defend their uses of 
force by reference to the least controversial aspects of Art. 51. 
72 Sean D. Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident, 94 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROCEEDINGS 302, 304 (2000) (“[W]hen NATO states 
consider whether to threaten or undertake a bombing attack in Kosovo, they 
must be prepared for a horizontal discourse among themselves and for a 
vertical discourse with their countries and their people. The ability . . . to make 
a persuasive case . . . turns . . . on whether a rational argument may be made 
that the intervention is either permissible or, at least, is not prohibited by 
international law."). 
73 SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 151; Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against 
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 
770, 773 (2012) [hereinafter Bethlehem] (“[I]t is important that principle is 
sensitive to the practical realities of the circumstances that it addresses, even as 
it endeavors to prohibit excess and the egregious pursuit of national interest.”). 
74 Critics of the efficacy and legitimacy of international law, including those 
who allege that it lacks the basic characteristics of law, point most often to its 
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uniquely vulnerable to alteration at the hands of practice, and it is 
important to seize the opportunity to push international law 
principles in the right direction, rather than have them borne 
away on currents of deviant state practice. To the extent that 
practice that is inconsistent with jus ad bellum de lege lata can be 
accommodated in law without diminishing the efficacy of law, 
there is no reason to shy away. From this perspective, the pin-
prick doctrine is a valuable candidate.  
 
II. State and Judicial Practice 
  
 The previous section argued that there is a need to 
rationalise international law rules relating to self-defence to bring 
them in conformity with the reality of the threats facing states. 
The introduction to this paper argued that the pin-prick doctrine is 
a viable candidate for this rationalisation process. There, the pin-
prick doctrine was defined in the following terms: this doctrine 
recognises the existence of a right of self-defence in response to a 
series of armed attacks (each possibly falling below the gravity 
threshold, but together constituting a continuing armed attack 
which meets the gravity threshold) and supports exercise of that 
right in order to deter a future threat. In brief, there must be a 
continuing armed attack giving rise to a threat of future attack 
that motivates the use of force in self-defence to deter or prevent 
that future threat.  
 This doctrine finds significant recognition and support 
amongst the ‘most highly qualified publicists’.75 This section will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
failure to regulate the use of force by states. Such critics argue that 
international law rules on the use of force respond to state practice on use of 
force rather than shaping it. For discussions of this sort of reasoning and 
responses thereto, see generally Andrew T. Guxman, Rethinking International 
Law as Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROCEEDINGS 155 (2009); Anthony 
D’Amato, Is International Law Really ‘Law’?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293 (1985); 
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-4 (6th ed., 2008).   
75 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the United States’ Air 
Operation Against Libya, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 955 (1987) (“Faced with a 
series of terrorist attacks, organized and directed by another state, which 
cannot be met incident by incident, any state which has the capacity to do so is 
likely to employ force if it believes that by doing so it can put a stop to these 
attacks.”); Douglas Guilfoyle, The Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Interdicting Vessels in International Waters to Prevent the Spread of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 733, 762 (2005); Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, The Myth of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence, ASIL TASK FORCE ON 
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TERRORISM PAPERS 9-10 (2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 
(“[I]t is also the case that a victim of an attack may use force based on clear 
and convincing evidence that the enemy is preparing to attack again. In other 
words, the victim need not wait for new attacks to be mounted. The defense 
must be carried out within a reasonable time from the initial attack in order to 
fit the characterization of defense during ongoing armed attacks. If terrorists 
are planning a series of attacks in a terror campaign, the state may respond to 
prevent future attacks about which it has evidence. In the absence of 
convincing evidence of future attacks, however, responsive force could amount 
to unlawful reprisals or punishment. But the enemy’s intention to continue 
means that even armed force in self-defense is lawful. The world response to 
September 11 confirms this.”); David A. Sadoff, Striking a Sensible Balance 
on the Legality of Defensive First Strikes, 42 VAND. J. TRANSAT’L L. 441 
(2009); Jane E. Stromseth, Commentary on the Use of Force Against 
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 236, 236 (Lori Fisler Damrosch and David Scheffer 
eds., 1991) (“[I]t is at least possible to envision a series of violent attacks 
against a state originating from a terrorist training camp in another state that 
may arguably constitute an ‘armed attack giving rise to a right of self-
defense.’”); Higgins, supra note 34, at 301 (“[I]f a State has been subjected, 
over a period of time, to border raids by nationals of another State, which are 
openly supported by the Government of that State; to threats of a future, and 
possibly imminent, large-scale attack, and to harassing restrictions to her trade 
under alleged belligerent rights, may it use force in self-defence, in 
anticipation of the continuation of such action? The present writer is of the 
opinion that this question, thus phrased, must be answered affirmatively.”); 
SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 154 (in response to states: “‘defensive 
retaliation’ may be justified when a State has good reason to expect a series of 
attacks from the same source and such retaliation serves as a deterrent or 
protective action. However, a reprisal for revenge or as a penalty (or ‘lesson’) 
would not be defensive.”); SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 167 (in response to 
NSAs: “A series of attacks accompanied by bellicose statements by those 
associated with the terrorists are convincing indications that future attacks may 
be expected.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 206; Arend, supra note 35, at 99 
(”If there is a group such as Al Qaeda that has been committing a series of 
attacks against the United  States, preemption is not really at issue. Rather, the 
United States and its allies are simply engaging in standard self-defense 
against an ongoing, armed attack.”);  Bethlehem, supra note 73, at 775. 
 
A number of other publicists document the support for the pin-prick doctrine 
in state and judicial practice. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: 
STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 53-68, 101-05 
(2002); Dominic Raab, ‘Armed Attack’ After the Oil Platforms Case, 17 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 719, 732 (2004) [hereinafter Raab]; Iain Scobbie, Words My 
Mother Never Taught Me – “In Defense of the International Court,” 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 76, 77-79 (2005); Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, 
Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist 
Actors, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 154-55 (2007); Tams, supra note 7, at 
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survey the practice of states [Section III(A)] and international 
courts [Section III(B)] for support for defensive uses of force in 
response to continuing armed attacks motivated by deterrence of 
future threats.   
 
A. Support for the Pin-Prick Doctrine in State Practice 
  
 A survey of UNSC practice over the last 60 years 
demonstrates a significant body of state practice in support of the 
pin-prick doctrine as defined above.  
 In the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, the U.S.A. justified 
its use of force against North Vietnamese naval facilities and 
infrastructure on the grounds that the facilities had been used to 
target American naval vessels and such force was required to 
“prevent the recurrence of attacks on its ships”.76 In 1986, the 
U.S.A. bombed selected sites in Libya. These attacks were 
executed in response to the bombing of a discotheque in West 
Germany which was targeted against American military 
personnel present there. The American statement in the UNSC 
indicated that it could attribute the attack to the Libyan 
government, that it had information that further attacks were 
being planned, that diplomatic efforts to secure the cooperation 
had failed and that the targets were terrorist training camps and 
were chosen to prevent future attacks.77 The American 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388; Kritsiotis, supra note 7, at 166-71; Ruys, supra note 6. This practice 
should be weighed against contrary authority outlined supra note 6.  
76 Statement by UK: "[T]he United States had a right in accordance with the 
principle of self-defence in international law to take action directed to prevent 
the recurrence of attacks on its ships.” For UNSC discussion on this issue, 
including the U.S. justification and condemnations from the USSR and 
Czechoslovakia, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire 
of the Practice of the Security Council 1964-65 – Ch. XI, at 195-96, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
77 Statement by U.S.A.:  
 
"The United States had acted in self-defence only after other 
protracted efforts to deter the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from ongoing 
attacks against the United States in violation of the Charter had failed. 
Citing “direct, precise and irrefutable evidence” which demonstrated 
Libyan responsibility for a bombing in West Berlin on 5 April 1986 
and alluding to “clear evidence” that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was 
planning multiple attacks in the future, the United States was 
compelled to exercise its  right of self-defence."  
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intervention in Central America between 1980 and 1986 was 
justified in similar terms.78 In 1987, the U.S.A. justified military 
actions against Iranian naval vessels and oil rigs in the Persian 
Gulf as a necessary response to a continued pattern of hostile acts 
by the Iranian navy against U.S.-flagged vessels.79  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For the UNSC debate on this issue, including support from the U.K., and 
condemnation by Algeria, Qatar, Madagascar, Vietnam, Afghanistan, 
Czechoslovakia, Iran, Sudan, Bangladesh, Congo, Ghana, Nicaragua and 
Uganda, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council 1985-88 - Chapter XI, at 431-32, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. See also SCHACHTER, supra 
note 25, at 167-68; Greenwood, supra note 75.     
78 Franck, supra note 66, at 60-63.  
79 Iranian Oil Platforms, supra note 26, at 193-94, ¶ 67 (statement by U.S.A.): 
 
"In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I 
wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that United States forces 
have exercised their inherent right of self-defence under international 
law by taking defensive action in response to an attack by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran against a United States naval vessel in international 
waters of the Persian Gulf. The actions taken are necessary and are 
proportionate to the threat posed by such hostile Iranian actions. At 
approximately 1010 Eastern Daylight Time on 14 April the USS 
Samuel B. Roberts was struck by a mine approximately 60 miles east 
of Bahrain, in international waters. Ten US sailors were injured, one 
seriously, and the ship was damaged. The mine which struck the 
Roberts was one of at least four mines laid in this area. The United 
States has subsequently identified the mines by type, and we have 
conclusive evidence that these mines were manufactured recently in 
Iran. The mines were laid in shipping lanes known by Iran to be used 
by US vessels, and intended by them to damage or sink such vessels. 
This is but the latest in a series of offensive attacks and provocations 
Iranian naval forces have taken against neutral shipping in the 
international waters of the Persian Gulf. Through diplomatic 
channels, the United States has informed the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran on four separate occasions, most recently 19 
October 1987, that the United States would not accept Iran's 
minelaying in international waters or in the waters of neutral States. 
In October, my Government indicated that the United States did not 
seek a military confrontation with Iran, but that it would take 
appropriate defensive measures against such hostile actions. Starting 
at approximately O100 Eastern Daylight Time 18 April US forces 
attacked military targets in the Persian Gulf which have been used for 
attacks against non-belligerent shipping in international waterways of 
the Gulf. The US actions have been against legitimate military 
targets. All feasible measures have been taken to minimize the risk of 
civilian damage or casualties . . ."  
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 Similarly, in 1998, the U.S.A. bombed selected sites in 
Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the bombings of American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.80 Again the use of force was 
defended as being targeted against known sources of prior attacks 
which were expected to continue.81 In 2001, Operation Enduring 
Freedom against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 For the UNSC discussion of this issue and condemnation by the Arab 
League, see 1998 U.N.Y.B. 185; Letter Dated 25 September 1998 from the 
Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/894, at 2 (Sep. 25, 1998). 
81 Letter Dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780, at 1 (Aug. 20, 1998):  
 
"My Government has obtained convincing information from a variety 
of reliable sources that the organization of Usama Bin Ladin is 
responsible for the devastating bombings on 7 August 1998 of the 
United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. Those attacks 
resulted in the deaths of 12 American nationals and over 250 other 
persons, as well as numerous serious injuries and heavy property 
damage. The Bin Ladin organization maintains an extensive network 
of camps, arsenals and training and supply facilities in Afghanistan, 
and support facilities in Sudan, which have been and are being used to 
mount terrorist attacks against American targets. These facilities 
include an installation at which chemical weapons have been 
produced. In response to these terrorist attacks, and to prevent and 
deter their continuation, United States armed forces today struck at a 
series of camps and installations used by the Bin Ladin organization 
to support terrorist actions against the United States and other 
countries. In particular, United States forces struck a facility being 
used to produce chemical weapons in the Sudan and terrorist training 
and basing camps in Afghanistan. These attacks were carried out only 
after repeated efforts to convince the Government of the Sudan and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities 
down and to cease their cooperation with the Bin Ladin organization. 
That organization has issued a series of blatant warnings that "strikes 
will continue from everywhere" against American targets, and we 
have convincing evidence that further such attacks were in 
preparation from these same terrorist facilities. The United States, 
therefore, had no choice but to use armed force to prevent these 
attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United States has acted 
pursuant to the right of selfdefence confirmed by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations."  
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was in response to the terrorist strikes against the U.S.A. on 
September 11, 2001, was justified in similar terms.82   
 In 1964, the U.K. attacked Yemen and destroyed the Fort 
at Harib in response to a series of aggressive actions directed by 
Yemen against South Arabia, and designed to prevent the 
recurrence of such attacks.83 In response to continuing Algerian 
attacks upon its territory and armed forces in the UNSC in 1979, 
Morocco reserved the right to defend itself in accordance with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946, at 1 (Oct. 7, 2001):  
 
"Despite every effort by the United States and the international 
community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From 
the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to 
train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people 
throughout the world and target United States nationals and interests 
in the United States and abroad.  In response to these attacks, and in 
accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defence, United States armed forces have initiated actions designed to 
prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These actions 
include measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and 
military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”  
 
For UNSC discussion of this issue and universal endorsement, see U.N. Dep't 
of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security 
Council 2000-03 - Chapter XI, at 1005-06, 1013, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
83 Statement by UK:  
 
“[L]egitimate action of a defensive nature [] might sometimes have to 
take the form of a counter-attack. The territory of the Federation had 
been subjected to a series of acts of aggression over a considerable 
period of time and against which its people had asked to be defended. 
In that connexion the destruction of the fort at Harib with the 
minimum use of force, was therefore a defensive measure 
proportionate and confined to the necessities of the case, and lacked 
the essential element of vengeance or retribution. It was the latter use 
of force which was condemned by the Charter “and not the use force 
for defensive purposes such as warding off future attacks” (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
For UNSC discussion on this issue, including condemnation by the Ivory 
Coast, Morocco, United Arab Republic and Iraq, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & 
Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 
1964-65 – Ch. XI, at 194-95, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
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Art. 51.84 In 1985, Israel bombed terrorist camps in Tunisia 
which were sources of attacks against Israel and which Tunisia 
had been unable to shut down.85 This was repeated in 1982,86 
1988,87 1996,88 and 200689 in Lebanon and in 2003 in Syria.90 A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2151st mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2151 (Jun. 20, 
1979). 
85 Statement by Israel:  
 
"The representative of Israel responded to the assertion that his 
country’s raid was an unprovoked attack on a country not at war 
[Tunisia] with Israel by saying that every State had the responsibility 
to prevent armed attacks from occurring on its territory. Israel could 
never accept the notion that the bases and headquarters of “terrorist 
killers” should enjoy immunity anywhere, and at all times. 
Sovereignty could not be separated from its responsibilities, the chief 
of which was preventing a sovereign territory from being used as a 
launching ground for acts of aggression against another country. 
When a country abdicated that fundamental responsibility, either 
deliberately or through neglect, it risked taking upon itself the 
consequences of such a dereliction of duty. The representative 
explicitly argued that “the interest of a State in exercising protection 
over its nationals may take precedence over territorial sovereignty.”  
 
For the UNSC discussion of this issue see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security 
Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1985-8 - 
Chapter XI, at 429, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
86 Franck, supra note 66, at 57-60.  
87 Statement by Israel:  
 
"Israel claimed that its duty to protect the lives and security of its 
citizens, coupled with the inability of the Government of Lebanon to 
prevent the use of its territory for attacks against Israel, had led to 
Israeli retaliatory attacks against concentrations of PLO terrorists in 
Lebanon in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence. Israel 
further claimed that continued terrorist activity had hindered a 
permanent Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon."  
 
For UNSC discussion of this issue, including condemnation by Yugoslavia, the 
League of Arab States, UAE, PLO, Indonesia and Syria, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. 
& Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 
1985-8 - Chapter XI, at 427, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml. 
See also SCHACHTER, supra note 25, at 167.  
88 Statement by Israel:  
 
"During the debate, the delegation of Lebanon requested the Council, 
inter alia, to order Israel to stop its aggression against Lebanon and to 
withdraw all of its reinforcements, and to condemn the Israeli 
aggression against Lebanon. The representative of Israel stated that 
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similar argument was made by Israel with regard to its use of 
force against Egypt during the Six Day War in 1967.91 
 South Africa justified its uses of force against Angola and 
Namibia on the grounds that it was responding to attacks from 
NSAs operating from the territory of those states which 
constituted a continuing threat and which the governments of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
after a long period of restraint and the exhaustion of all political and 
diplomatic means, the Israel Defense Forces were exercising the right 
of self-defence by hitting back at Hizbullah strongholds. He further 
stated that if Lebanon did not have the ability or the will to control 
Hizbullah activities, Israel had to defend its security by all necessary 
measures."  
 
For UNSC discussion of this issue including support from U.S.A. and 
Germany condemnation by Indonesia, Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Afghanistan, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia, Malaysia, 
Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Botswana, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security 
Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1996-9 - 
Chapter XI, at 1172, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
89 In response to Hezbollah attacks mounted from the territory of Lebanon, 
Israel reserved the right to act in self-defence under Art. 51 and informed the 
UNSC that it would "take the appropriate actions to secure the release of the 
kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling that terrorizes our citizens." 
For UNSC discussion of this issue including partial endorsement from the UN 
Secretary-General, Slovakia, Peru, Denmark, France, Brazil, Canada, Australia 
and Guatemala, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire 
of the Practice of the Security Council 2004-07 – Ch. XI, at 171, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.     
90 Statement by Israel:  
 
"At its 4836th meeting, on 5 October 2003, the Council discussed two 
letters dated 5 October 2003 from the representatives of the Syrian 
Arab Republic and Lebanon, respectively. By the two letters, the 
aforementioned representatives requested the Council to convene an 
emergency meeting to consider Israel’s military action targeting a site 
situated inside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. During the 
debate, the representative of Israel insisted that Israel’s response to 
the suicide bombings against a terrorist training facility in the Syrian 
Arab Republic was “a clear act of self-defence in accordance with 
Article 51 of the Charter.”  
 
For UNSC discussion of this issue including condemnation by Egypt, Sudan, 
Libya and the Arab League, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, 
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2000-03 - Chapter XI, at 
1013, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
91 Franck, supra note 66, at 55-6; DINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 206-7.  
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Angola and Namibia were unable to control or prevent.92 Portugal 
justified use of force over the 1960s and 1970s against several 
African states on the grounds that it was responding to terrorists 
operating from the territories of those countries.93 In 1993, Iran 
bombed bases of a terrorist group located in Iraq. Iran informed 
the UNSC that the group in question had been responsible for 
attacks against Iran and the use of force was undertaken to 
prevent and suppress such attacks. 94 This was repeated in 199995 
and again in 2000.96 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 For the UNSC discussion of this issue and the near universal condemnation 
of the South African invocation of the right of self-defence, see U.N. Dep't of 
Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security 
Council 1985-88 – Ch. XI, at 428-31, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; GRAY, supra note 24, at 137. 
93 GRAY, supra note 24, at 136-7.  
94 Statement by Iran:  
 
"By a letter dated 25 May 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General,  
the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that, in 
accordance with Article 51, the Islamic Republic Air Force had 
carried out an operation against the military bases located in Iraq of a 
terrorist group, where armed attacks against and incursions into 
Iranian territory had originated."  
 
For UNSC discussion of this issue, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council 
Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1993-95 – Ch. XI, at 
1150, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
95 Statement by Iran:  
 
“[T]he representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that 
terrorist groups from the territory of Iraq were operating along the 
Iranian border. He noted that, in response to those activities, and in 
accordance with its inherent right of self-defence enshrined in Article 
51 of the Charter, his country took immediate and proportional 
measures, which were necessary for curbing and suppressing such 
aggressive activities. He further reported that the Iranian defence 
forces pursued the retreating armed groups that had attacked civilian 
targets in the border towns of Piranshahr, Mahabad and Oroumiyeh, 
and targeted their training camps in Iraq. He emphasized that while 
reserving its inherent right to self-defence in accordance with Article 
51 of the Charter, Iran respected the territorial integrity of Iraq."  
 
For the UNSC discussion of this issue, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security 
Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1996-99 – 
Ch. XI, at 1178, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
96 Statement by Iran:  
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Turkey has used force against Iraq in 1995 on similar grounds.97 
In 2008, Azerbaijan, in response to the continued Armenian 
occupation of Nagorny Karabakh, and the continued mounting of 
armed attacks by Armenians from within that territory reserved 
its right of to use force in self-defence against the Armenian 
terrorists98 as well as against the illegal Armenian occupation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"By a letter dated 15 February 2000 addressed to the Secretary-
General, the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported 
that terrorist groups from the Iraqi territory were operating along the 
Iranian border. He noted that Iran reserved its legitimate right to self-
defence and would respond to such hostile acts if they continued. In a 
series of letters addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran reported that members of the terrorist 
Mojahedin Khalq Organization, authorized by the Government of Iraq 
to be based on Iraqi soil, engaged in acts of sabotage against Iran. He 
stated that Iran considered intolerable the continuation of such hostile 
acts and reserved its right to legitimate self-defence and removal of 
any threats. By a letter dated 18 April 2001 addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, the representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran informed the Council that in response to the acts of terrorism 
committed by members of the terrorist Mojahedin Khalq 
Organization based in Iraq, the armed forces of Iran, in accordance 
with Article 51, took a “limited and proportionate defensive measure” 
against a number of that entity’s bases in Iraq."  
 
For the UNSC discussion of this issue, see U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security 
Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2000-03 – 
Ch. XI, at 1016, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
97 Franck, supra note 69, at 63-4; GRAY, supra note 24, at 140-3. 
98 Letter dated 22 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of 
Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretar-General, U.N. Doc. 
S/2008/812, at 10 (Dec. 24, 2008): 
 
"Immediacy has not been recognized by the ICJ as a condition to the 
exercise of the right of self-defence. By contrast, some scholars 
believe that it is. All the same, immediacy does not present any real 
difficulty to the Republic of Azerbaijan in the present case, taking the 
view that, “although immediacy serves as a core element of self-
defence, it must be interpreted reasonably”.  More specifically, the 
main factors here are: (i) Time consumed by negotiations (designed to 
satisfy the condition of necessity) does not count. (ii) The Republic of 
Azerbaijan actually commenced to exercise its right of self-defence as 
early as the summer of 1992 (shortly after the onset of the armed 
attack by the Republic of Armenia and without any undue time-lag). 
The fact that fighting was later suspended through acceptance of a 
cease-fire  means that what is at balance today is not an initial 
invocation but a resumption of the exercise of the right of self-
defence. (iii) In any event, when an armed attack produces continuous 
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 It is thus clear that there is a significant amount of state 
practice in support of the pin-prick doctrine. At least nine states 
have invoked this doctrine in over twenty different instances 
dating over a period from the beginning of the Charter regime to 
the present day, and at least nineteen other states have endorsed 
these invocations. Nonetheless this practice may be found 
wanting on two grounds: it applies primarily to the use of force 
against NSAs, and all these cases also involve significant 
opposition to the use of force.  
 With regard to the question of NSAs, it might be argued 
that much of this practice involves the use of force against NSAs 
and therefore, to the extent that it is useful, it is useful only with 
regard to defensive uses of force against NSAs. This is untrue 
because in all of these cases, though force has been used against 
NSAs, the territorial integrity of the host state has been 
impugned, and the defence and criticism of the use of force has 
revolved primarily around the question of use of force against 
states.  
 With regard to the question of opposition of states, it may 
be argued that many states have criticised these instances of use 
of force as inconsistent with the legal limits of the right of self-
defence. With the notable exception of the American invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, all of the cited instances have been 
criticised by several states and explicitly referred to as illegal. A 
more optimistic assessment of this state practice discussed should 
be preferred, for the following three reasons.  
 First, critical statements of states should be treated with 
caution. The reason for this is that the critical states do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
effects (through occupation) – and in the time that lapsed since the 
start of the armed attack the victim does not sleep on its rights, but 
keeps pressing ahead with (barren) attempts to resolve the conflict 
amicably – the right of self-defence is kept intact, despite the long 
period intervening between the genesis of the use of (unlawful) force 
and the ultimate (lawful) stage of recourse to counter-force. The 
Republic of Azerbaijan – as the victim of an armed attack – retains its 
right of self-defence, and can resume exercising it as soon as it 
becomes readily apparent that prolonging the negotiations is an 
exercise in futility. The duration of the right of self-defence is 
determined by the armed attack. “As long as the attack lasts, the 
victim State is entitled to react”.  By responding to the continued 
armed attack by Armenia, Azerbaijan will not be responding to an 
event that occurred in the early 1990s. It will be responding to a 
present reality."  
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necessarily possess the opinio juris required to transform their 
practice into accurate statements of customary international law.99 
 To begin with, many of the critical states have themselves 
resorted to defensive uses of force in accordance with the pin-
prick doctrine. For instance, Morocco condemned the UK action 
against Yemen, but itself reserved the right to use force against 
continuing threats from Algerian territory.100 Similarly, Iran has 
regularly condemned Israeli uses of force against terrorist training 
camps in neighbouring countries,101 but carried out similar strikes 
in Iraq.102 The U.S.A.103 and U.K.104 have regularly engaged in 
uses of force justified in this manner, but still criticised similarly 
justified uses of force by South Africa.105  
 Moreover, in many cases the opposition of states has been 
based on failure to comply with requirements of necessity and 
proportionality or other legal requirements of valid uses of 
defensive force.106 This is largely because there are significant 
evidentiary difficulties associated with defending uses of force107 
and debates on particular uses of force are characterised by both 
sides claiming the right of self-defence and characterising the 
other as the unlawful aggressor.108 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 The possibility that all state practice does not necessarily reflect opinio juris 
is eloquently expressed by the ICJ in its judgment in Nicaragua, supra note 26, 
at ¶ 207:  
 
"The United States authorities have on some occasions clearly stated 
their grounds for intervening in the affairs of a foreign State for 
reasons connected with, for example, the domestic policies of that 
country, its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its 
foreign policy. But these were statements of international policy, and 
not an assertion of rules of existing international law."  
 
100 Supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.  
101 Supra note 88 and accompanying text.  
102 Supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.  
103 Supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.  
104 Supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
105 Supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
106 GRAY, supra note 24, at 155: suggesting that evidence of condemnation “be 
interpreted as based strictly on the special facts of these cases.” 
107 Supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
108 See, e.g., the UNSC discussion on the 1948 use of force between India and 
Pakistan in U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council 1946-51 – Ch. XI, at 448-49, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; the UNSC discussion of the  
1958 French bombing of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in Tunisia  in U.N. Dep't of Pol. 
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 Finally, these condemnations are often motivated by 
ideological differences with the state using force. For instance, 
the universal condemnation of uses of force by Portugal and 
South Africa under the pin-prick doctrine were motivated by 
opposition to the colonial policies of Portugal and the racist 
regime in South Africa.109 Similarly, the condemnation of Israeli 
action was largely by Arab states based on ideological 
differences.110 
 Second, the fact that so many states explicitly rely on the 
pin-prick doctrine (or its elements) should be granted extra 
significance. The reason for this is that states try and justify their 
uses of force by reference to the strongest, least controversial 
arguments, and their reliance on the pin-prick doctrine strongly 
indicates belief in the legality of their actions.111  
 Third, most of this practice is from the pre-9/11 period. 
Arguably, the universal support for Operation Enduring Freedom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 
1956-8 – Ch. XI, at 174, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; 
Chadian allegations of aggression from Sudan in Letter dated 15 January 2008 
from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/21, at 1 (Jan. 15, 
2008); Compare Letter dated 15 October 2008 from the Permanent 
Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2008/653, at 1-2 (Oct. 15, 2008) and 
Letter dated 16 October 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2008/657, at 2 (Oct. 17, 2008) for competing assessments of a use of 
force between Cambodia and Thailand in 2008; the UNSC discussion of the 
situation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004 in 
U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council 2004-07 – Ch. XI, at 173, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; the UNSC discussion of the 
situation between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo in U.N. 
Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council 2004-07 – Ch. XI, at 174, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; the UNSC discussion of the 
Russian invasion of Georgia in U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, 
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2008-09 – Ch. XI, at 216, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml; the UNSC discussion of the 
situation in Cyprus in U.N. Dep't of Pol. & Security Council Affairs, 
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1985-8 – Ch. XI, at 428, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml.  
109 GRAY, supra note 24, at 139-40.  
110 Many of the protesting states explicitly argued that Israel was the first 
aggressor and could not therefore rely on self-defence.  
111 GRAY, supra note 24, at 118.  
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demonstrates the beginning of a shift in state attitudes towards the 
pin-prick doctrine. This conclusion is reinforced by Reisman and 
Armstrong’s 2006 survey of state practice finding that several 
states, including Taiwan, Russia, North Korea, Israel, India, Iran, 
France, China, U.K., Japan and Australia, recognised broad rights 
of pre-emptive self-defence against NSAs.112 Pre-emptive self-
defence is significantly broader than the pin-prick doctrine and 
support for the former may safely be assumed to imply support 
for the latter. The pin-prick doctrine clearly does not enjoy 
universal support. But it does enjoy considerable and credible 
support.  
 
B. Support for the Pin-Prick Doctrine in Judicial 
Decisions 
  
 Four significant ICJ decisions which have discussed jus 
ad bellum question have implicitly recognised the pin-prick 
doctrine.  
 In the Nicaragua case, in reference to the attacks on 
Honduras and Costa Rica the ICJ remarked that the lack of 
information available to the court “renders it difficult to decide 
whether they may be treated for legal purposes as amounting, 
singly, or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua on either 
or both states.”113 Arguably the court implicitly allowed for the 
possibility of the pin-prick doctrine. In fact, Judge Schwebel’s 
dissenting opinion specifically recognised the validity of the pin-
prick doctrine.114 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Armstrong and Reisman, supra note 36. 
113 Nicaragua, supra note 26, at ¶ 231. 
114 Nicaragua – Schwebel, supra note 34, at 368-69, ¶ 213 (quoting Robert 
Ago):  
 
"There remains the third requirement, namely that armed resistance to 
armed attack should take place immediately, i.e., while the attack is 
still going on, and not after it has ended. A State can no longer claim 
to be acting in self-defence if, for example, it drops bombs on a 
country which has made an armed raid into its territory after the raid 
has ended and the troops have withdrawn beyond the frontier. If, 
however, the attack in question consisted of a number of successive 
acts, the requirement of the immediacy of the self-defensive action 
would have to be looked at in the light of those acts as a whole. At all 
events, practice and doctrine seem to endorse this requirement fully, 
which is not surprising in view of its plainly logical link with the 
whole concept of self-defence." 
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 Similarly, in the Iranian Oil Platforms case, the court was 
confronted with a claim by the U.S.A. that its use of force against 
Iranian naval vessels and oil rigs was justified as a response to a 
continuing pattern of attacks by Iran against U.S. flagged 
vessels.115 The court, assuming that the attacks could be 
attributed to Iran, posed the question of “whether that attack, 
either in itself or in combination with the rest of the "series of. . . 
attacks" cited by the United States can be categorized as an 
"armed attack" on the United States justifying self-defence.”116 
The court concluded, however, that given the context of the 
alleged attacks (war between Iran and Iraq) it could not be 
conclusively established that the attacks, even if carried out by 
Iran, were targeted against the U.S.A.117 Thus, the court framed 
the question in terms of the pin-prick doctrine but avoided 
answering it by reference to evidentiary concerns.118 The court 
went on to state that it “does not exclude the possibility that the 
mining of a single military vessel might be sufficient to bring into 
play the ‘inherent right of self-defence’,” but nonetheless rejected 
American claims of self-defence owing to lack of evidence. 
Admittedly, the court did not explicitly endorse the pin-prick 
doctrine.119 But the fact that the court framed the operative 
question in terms of the pin-prick doctrine (whether a series of 
attacks can constitute an armed attack) and conceded that a single 
attack could justify defensive use of force (seemingly at odds 
with the Nicaragua gravity requirement) at the very least tilts the 
balance towards acknowledgement of the pin-prick doctrine.120  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
115 Supra note 79 above and accompanying text.  
116 Iranian Oil Platforms, supra note 26, at 191, ¶ 64.  
117 Id. 
118 Raab, supra note 75, at 732 (2004). 
119 Esther Salamanca-Aguado and Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz, Exploring the Limits of 
International Law Relating to the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 499, 522-23 (2005). 
120 The judgment of the court as it relates to the international law rules on self-
defence should however be relied upon with caution. Many of the separate and 
dissenting opinions attached to the main judgment of the court criticised the 
court for unnecessarily delving into the self-defence question and for violating 
the non ultra petita rule. Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 
Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 306 (Nov. 6); Case 
Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Separate Opinion of Judge 
Buergenthal, 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 270-1, ¶ 3 (Nov. 6); Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, 2003 I.C.J. 
161, at 247, ¶ 3 (Nov. 6); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 
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 In the case involving Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo, the Court held that "[t]he Court is of the view that, on 
the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks 
could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained 
non- attributable to the [Democratic Republic of the Congo]."121 
“"Accordingly, the Court has no need to respond to the 
contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what 
conditions contemporary international law provides for a right of 
self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces."122 
Thus, once again, the Court acknowledged the possibility of the 
pin-prick doctrine, but stopped just short of explicitly recognising 
it based on evidentiary concerns. Judge Kooijmans, however, in 
his separate opinion, explicitly recognised the pin-prick 
doctrine.123 
 In the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, Cameroon 
argued for a series of attacks by Nigeria to be considered 
cumulatively. The court didn’t rule on the issue on the ground 
that the attacks hadn’t been adequately imputed to Nigeria.124  
 As with state practice judicial recognition of the pin-prick 
doctrine falls short of clear recognition of the pin-prick doctrine. 
This is primarily a result of the strict application of the court’s 
non ultra petita rule.125 But it does nevertheless provide strong 
support for the recognition of the doctrine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Separate Opinion of Judge Parra-Arranguren, 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 244, ¶ 14 
(Nov. 6); Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Separate Opinion of 
Judge Higgins, 2003 I.C.J. 161, at 239, ¶ 50 (Nov. 6). See also Raab, supra 
note 75, at 719 (2004).  
121 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C. J. 223, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). 
122 Id. at ¶ 147. 
123 Id. at ¶ 32 ("I am of the view that the series of attacks which were carried 
out from June till the beginning of August 1998, and which are enumerated in 
paragraph 132 of the Judgment, can be said to have amounted to an armed 
attack in the sense of Article 51, thus entitling Uganda to the exercise of self-
defence. Although Uganda, during the proceedings, persistently claimed that 
the DRC was directly or indirectly involved in these attacks, the finding that 
this allegation cannot be substantiated and that these attacks are therefore not 
attributable to the DRC has no direct legal relevance for the question whether 
Uganda is entitled to exercise its right of self-defence."). 
124 ICJ Reports, 2002, e.g. land and maritime boundaries between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303, ¶ 323.  
125 See generally Alexander Orakhelashvili, The International Court and ‘its 
Freedom to Select the Ground Upon Which it Will Base Its Judgment, 56 INT'L 
& COMP. L.Q. 171 (2007); H.E. Judge Peter Kooijmans, The ICJ in the 21st 
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III. The Pin-Prick Doctrine 
  
 The previous two sections have demonstrated the need for 
rationalisation of the Charter regime rules relating to self-
defence, and the acceptance of the pin-prick doctrine in state and 
judicial practice.  This section defines the pin-prick doctrine and 
defends its ability to rationalise Charter rules without weakening 
them.  
 The pin-prick doctrine operates to allow use of force in 
self-defence in response to a series of armed attacks, each 
possibly failing below the gravity threshold, but together 
constituting a continuing armed attack which meets the gravity 
threshold, and supports anticipation of a future threat, in order to 
deter that threat. The fact that this doctrine allows the use of 
defensive force in response to a series of individually 
insignificant attacks - pin-pricks, and that it permits the 
cumulative consideration of a series of attacks – accumulation of 
events, accounts for its strange names. To reiterate, the pin-prick 
doctrine does not support many uses of force currently outside the 
ambit of the Charter rules, but which are nonetheless legitimate. 
For instance, there may well be cases where pre-emptive self-
defence is justified. But those uses of force cannot be justified by 
reference to the pin-prick doctrine. The pin-prick doctrine 
acquires relevance where the presence of past attacks can be 
invoked to demonstrate an objective future threat.  
 This much with regard to the pin-prick doctrine can be 
reliably derived from the state, judicial and academic practice 
reviewed in the previous section. There is little discussion, 
however, of the intricacies of application of this doctrine.126  
 The following list of principles represents the author’s 
analysis as to the practical operation of this doctrine: 
 
1) First, there must be an armed attack.127 Under the pin-prick 
doctrine, this requirement can be satisfied by a series of 
attacks which can together constitute a continuing attack. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Century: Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism, or Proactive Judicial Policy, 56 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 741 (2007). 
126 Oscar Schachter provides the most comprehensive analysis available on this 
issue, but focusing on uses of force against NSAs. SCHACHTER, supra note 25, 
at 167-73. 
127 Supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
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begs the question of how many individual attacks constitute a 
continuing attack? No definite ex ante answer can be 
provided on this point. It is possible to imagine 10 attacks 
being inadvertent and not representative of a pattern of 
attacks, but it is also possible to infer a pattern from just two 
attacks. This will have to be determined on the basis of the 
facts of each situation. Some factors which might be useful to 
consider are: number of attacks, time between attacks, 
intensity of individual attacks and explanation (if any) for the 
attacks. If years elapse between attacks, it is unlikely that a 
continuing pattern can be established. Similarly, ‘frontier 
incidents’ no matter how frequent are unlikely to indicate a 
continuing pattern of armed attacks. Again, if individual 
attacks can be reasonably explained as accidents or localised 
to specific provocation, they are unlikely to be amenable to 
construction as a continuing attack.  
 
2) Second, the continuing attack must meet the gravity 
requirement.128 The gravity requirement under the pin-prick 
doctrine does not apply to individual attacks, but to the 
continuing pattern as a whole. The substantive content of the 
gravity analysis will remain the same as it is under the 
traditional self-defence right.  
 
3) Third, there must be a temporal connection between the attack 
and self-defence.129 Under the pin-prick doctrine this 
requirement is modified in that defensive use of force is 
permissible on the basis of anticipation of a future threat. 
Again, it is difficult to stipulate ex ante what exactly satisfies 
this requirement. It is clear that this is not the same standard 
as that applied for anticipatory self-defence: that standard 
applies with regard to imminent threats.130 The standard 
sought here derives certainty regarding the possibility of 
occurrence of future events from the fact of occurrence of 
past events. Thus, this requirement should be linked to the 
continuing armed attack requirement. If the latter can be 
demonstrated, the former may be presumed, though the 
presumption should be subject to rebuttal and scrutiny if it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
129 Supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.  
130 Supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
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at all likely that the attacking entity might have ceased its 
continuing attack. 
 
4) Fourth, the use of force must be necessary.131 The necessity 
analysis under traditional self-defence has two elements: no 
alternative to the use of force, and immediacy. The 
immediacy requirement is relaxed in this case.132 The 
defensive use of force need not be initiated in response to the 
attack; it may be commenced afterwards. But this relaxation 
is not infinite. On the facts the defensive use of force must be 
capable of being characterised as a response to an armed 
attack, rather than retaliation. The objective must be response 
and deterrence rather than retaliation or retribution. This is a 
subjective standard, but one that may be inferred from the 
facts.  
 The other aspect of necessity is the absence of alternatives 
to the use of force. This analysis will remain the same as 
under the traditional self-defence right: have all options for 
peaceful resolution been exhausted? But its importance is 
magnified in the case of the pin-prick doctrine. The threshold 
is already higher because force is not being used as a response 
to an on-going attack but a continuing attack, and thus the 
avenues for peaceful resolution are greater. But the necessity 
analysis can be used to reinforce the determination of whether 
there is a continuing armed attack and whether there is a 
credible future threat. If all peaceful options have been 
exhausted without success, this will undoubtedly bolster the 
conclusion that there is a continuing armed attack and it can 
be expected to recur in the future. For instance, using the 
example of the U.S.A. and the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, use of force was initiated against the Taliban 
and against Al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan after all peaceful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
132 GARDAM, supra note 7, at 151 points out that even in traditional self-
defence, use of force need not necessarily be immediate. She points out that in 
the British use of defensive force in the Falklands conflict, and in the 
collective use of force in the first Gulf war, defensive uses of force were 
initiated well after the offensive force had ceased. I would argue, however, that 
in both those cases there was a continuing illegality (illegal occupation of land 
– in itself a use of force against territorial integrity) which the defensive use of 
force was responding to and therefore the immediacy requirement was, in fact, 
adhered to in those cases.  
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measures had been exhausted, reinforcing the notion that the 
U.S.A. was under attack from Al-Qaida, and that future 
attacks could be expected.  
 
5) Fifth, the use of force must be proportionate.  The substantive 
content of this analysis will remain the same as it is under the 
traditional self-defence right – no more force should be used 
than is necessary.133 
 
6) Sixth, the pin-prick doctrine deviates from traditional self-
defence in three ways: gravity, immediacy and temporal 
connection. The gravity requirement is different in that it can 
be satisfied by the attacks construed together, rather than by 
each attack individually. The fact that defensive force can be 
employed after an attack has been completed and in response 
to an anticipated future attack represents a deviation from the 
traditional requirements of immediacy and temporal 
connection. 
 
7) Seventh, in other ways the pin-prick doctrine is similar to 
traditional self-defence. The necessity and proportionality 
analysis, as well as the gravity analysis remain the same. 
Even though the legal test will remain the same, the context 
of its application will differ. For instance, the gravity test will 
now be applied to a series of attacks rather than an individual 
attack, but the contents of that test will remain the same. 
Similarly, the contents of the necessity analysis will remain 
the same – whether there is any other plausible alternative to 
the use of force - but will be applied in the context of a series 
of past attacks rather than a single attack. Engagement with 
the details of the necessity and gravity analysis is necessarily 
fact-specific and is not amenable to codification in a simple 
test. It is thus not considered in greater detail here. In any 
case, given that the analysis remains the same in traditional 
self-defence and in pin-prick self-defence, it is unnecessary to 
delve into those details here. 
 
8) Eighth, the pin-prick doctrine is distinct from pre-emptive 
self-defence. There are two versions of pre-emptive self-
defence in practice – one which anticipates a future threat on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 GARDAM, supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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the basis of prior animosity, and one which anticipates a 
future threat on the basis of prior attacks.134 Insofar as the 
latter’s characterisation of prior attacks satisfies the future 
threat analysis required by the third point above, it is the same 
as the pin-prick doctrine being discussed here. Insofar as the 
past attacks do not support an inference of future threat, the 
past attacks are equivalent to mere past animosity, and 
functionally similar to the first version. The pin-prick doctrine 
is distinct from this first version – the use of defensive force 
in response to a possible future threat from an inimical entity.  
 The difference lies, first, in the assessment of past 
conduct. Pre-emptive self-defence as defined here requires 
hostility. The pin-prick doctrine requires a continuing pattern 
of armed attacks. Pre-emptive self-defence is akin to harming 
an enemy because you don’t like him, and don’t want him to 
gain an edge that might shift or alter the balance of power.135 
The pin-prick doctrine supports attacking an enemy because 
he has harmed you in the past and will do so again in the 
future. This is, in effect, a stronger necessity requirement. The 
second difference, arising from the first, is the probability of a 
future threat. The probability is greater in the case of the pin-
prick doctrine because it is based on precedent instead of fear. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The former is the classical ‘hard case’ example of pre-emptive self-defence. 
But in practice, invocations of the right of pre-emptive self-defence tend to 
resemble invocations of the pin-prick doctrine. Both the American use of force 
against Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli use of force against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 
1981, classical examples of pre-emptive self-defence, in fact relied more 
heavily on characterisation of pre-existing hostilities and clashes than on pre-
emption of a possible future threat. 
135 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 80 (2nd ed., 1992) [hereinafter WALZER]:  
 
"… there is a great difference, nonetheless, between killing and being 
killed by soldiers who can plausibly be described as the present 
instruments of an aggressive intention, and killing and being killed by 
soldiers who may or may not represent a distant danger to our 
country. In the first case, we confront an army recognizably hostile, 
ready for war, fixed in a posture of attack. In the second, the hostility 
is prospective and imaginary, and it will always be a charge against us 
that we have made war upon soldiers who were themselves engaged 
in entirely legitimate (non-threatening) activities. Hence, the moral 
necessity of rejecting any attack that is merely preventive in 
character, that does not wait upon and respond to the willful acts of an 
adversary." 
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This is, in effect, a manifestation of a stronger necessity 
requirement. 136  
 
9) Ninth, the pin-prick doctrine is distinct from armed reprisals. 
Armed reprisals are characterised by retribution or retaliation. 
The pin-prick doctrine is characterised by deterrence.  
 The foregoing analysis is guilty of a certain deliberate 
vagueness. It has not provided exact meaning to concepts such as 
gravity, necessity and proportionality; nor has it specified an 
exact definition of continuing armed attack or future threat. The 
reason for this is that these concepts are not easily reduced to 
concise legal tests.137 These are concepts which are assessed on 
the facts of individual cases and only general guidelines are 
possible. For instance, even with regard to well-established 
components of the right of self-defence, such as necessity, after at 
least 50 years of post-Charter practice, the test that has emerged 
is ‘exhaustion of peaceful measures’. This test does not specify a 
list of peaceful measures, or when a particular measure may be 
said to be exhausted. But this is a general characteristic shared by 
all aspects of the right of self-defence.  
 As noted above, any doctrinal amendment to the right of 
self-defence should not just be suited to protecting the interests of 
individual states but should also fit the interests of the community 
of states, i.e. it should not excessively weaken the Charter regime. 
The pin-prick doctrine satisfies both those interests.  
 It satisfies state security interests by relaxing restrictions 
on defensive uses of force. Under lex lata states are vulnerable to 
attacks which fall below the gravity threshold. Under the pin-
prick doctrine if the attack is part of a series of continuing 
attacks, each below the gravity threshold, but all collectively 
inimical to state security and sovereignty, defensive uses of force 
would be permitted. Under lex lata defensive uses of force that 
are not immediate are questionable under the necessity 
requirement. Under the pin-prick doctrine a delayed response 
against a continuing threat would be permissible. Under lex lata 
defensive uses of force are temporally constrained to responses to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 It is in this regard that 2003 American use of force against Iraq and the 
1981 Israeli use of force against Iraq differ from the pin-prick doctrine.  
137 E.g., DINSTEIN 207 (referring to anticipation): “The invocation of the right 
to self-defence must be weighed on the ground of the reliable information 
available (and reasonably interpreted) at the moment of the action, without the 
benefit of post factum wisdom.” 
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on-going, imminent, or at best definite future threats. Under the 
pin-prick doctrine an anticipatory or even pre-emptive response 
would be acceptable provided the two requirements of continuing 
armed attack and future threat are met.  
 It satisfies collective security interests by making those 
relaxations contingent on the ability to establish a continuing 
armed attack. First, unlike the intelligence and confidential 
information which forms the basis of pre-emptive self-defence, 
information regarding past attacks can be shared with other states, 
assuming it is not already in the public domain. Second, sharing 
this information with other states and allowing them to assess the 
evidence to their satisfaction introduces a measure of 
transparency and objectivity. Third, reliance on prior attacks as a 
basis for defensive uses of force provides scope for oversight that 
is at least equivalent to that which is available with regard to 
traditional exercises of self-defence. Even when force is used in 
accordance with the traditional or strict right of self-defence, 
states are rarely able to agree on whether it is legal or not. 
Differences as to who attacked and who defended, whether the 
force was necessary, etc., regularly feature in debates regarding 
such uses of force,138 and are not a function of the lack of clarity 
regarding the norms which govern the law of self-defence, so 
much as they are a function of the political nature of discussions 
regarding uses of force.139   
 The introduction to this paper discussed the example of 
Fornjot, Janus and Telesto. That is a classic example of 
invocation of the pin-prick doctrine. In concluding this section it 
would be useful to consider some variations on that factual 
scenario to emphasize some of the arguments set out here.  
 In the absence of prior attacks, if Fornjot responds to an 
on-going attack, or to a declaration of attack, or confirmed 
information of an imminent attack, irrespective of whether it is 
using force against a state or an NSA, it would be validly 
exercising its traditional right of self-defence, subject to 
satisfaction of the other requirements of Art. 51.  
 In the absence of prior attacks, if Fornjot responds not to 
confirmation of an imminent attack, but hostile rhetoric or a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
139 WALZER, supra note 135, at 74: "These are questions of fact, not of 
judgment, and if the answers are disputed, it is only because of the lies that 
governments tell.” 
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perception of threat, it would be engaging in lawful pre-emptive 
self-defence if it was responding to an NSA, and unlawful pre-
emptive self-defence if it was responding to a state.140  
 If there are prior attacks, but there is evidence to support 
the cessation of the threat, i.e., there is no future threat, 
irrespective of whether the target of the force was a state or an 
NSA, it would constitute an unlawful reprisal.141   
 The conclusions drawn from these examples can be 
summarised in the form of the following decision tree: 
 
 
Decision Tree for Assessing Legality of Defensive Uses of Force, 
Assuming Fulfilment of Other Art. 51 Requirements 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Armstrong and Reisman, supra note 36, at 547-48.  
141 In the absence of hostilities, even a hostile NSA cannot be the target of 
military action. It would instead have to be dealt with under a human rights 
and law enforcement framework. See generally David Kretzmer, Targeted 
Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate 
Deference?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2005).   
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Conclusion 	  
 Regulating the ability of states to resort to the military 
instrument is simultaneously the primary function of international 
law and its greatest challenge. Regulating use of force is a 
primary function of international law because if states could 
freely resort to force the ideal of rule of law in international 
society would be impossible.142 At the same time, it is in this 
endeavour that international law is most frequently and justifiably 
criticised.143 International law’s failure to adequately regulate use 
of military force begs the question of the reason for this failure. 
Conceptually, there are two possibilities. One is that the rules are 
substantively inadequate: they are overly permissive and fail to 
adequately constrain states;144 or they are overly restrictive and 
excessively constrain the ability of states to protect themselves.145 
The other is that problem lies not in the rules themselves but in 
their enforcement.146  
 Both of these explanations play a role in the shortcomings 
of jus ad bellum. Historically, international law rules on the use 
of force have been challenged by a tension between the rights of 
states to safeguard their security and the interests of the 
international community in proscribing resort to the military 
instrument. The UN Charter regime on use of force balances this 
tension by maintaining strict control over the ability of states to 
use force, and protecting the security of states by creating a 
collective security mechanism. Unfortunately in practice the 
collective security mechanism – the UNSC - has been 
incapacitated by political considerations. At the same time, the 
strictness of rules regulating the ability of states to use military 
force has not been relaxed. This has created a situation where jus 
ad bellum rules are substantively flawed – because they are too 
restrictive and impair legitimate security interests, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 64 (1933).  
143 Supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
144 One example of this is rules regulating use of force in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. DINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 82-3. 
145 “International law is not a suicide pact.” Supra note 5 and accompanying 
text.  
146 An example of this sort of issue is the difficulty associated with evidentiary 
issues relating to uses of force. Supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
	  	  	  
70 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 	  
inadequately enforced – because of the failure of the UNSC, and 
dissatisfaction and proposals for reform are rampant.  
 In this context this paper suggested that given the obvious 
flaws in jus ad bellum de lege lata, there was a need for the 
rationalisation of international law rules relating to self-defence. 
But this rationalisation would have to first and foremost ensure 
that the use of force continued to be a last resort for states.  
 A possible candidate for a rationalising development in 
international law rules on self-defence is the pin-prick doctrine, 
which recognises the existence of a right of self-defence in 
response to a series of armed attacks, each possibly failing below 
the gravity threshold, but together constituting a continuing 
armed attack which meets the gravity threshold, and supports 
exercise of that right in anticipation of a future threat, in order to 
deter that threat.  
 An examination of state and judicial practice 
demonstrated that this doctrine enjoyed considerable, if not 
overwhelming and uncontested, support.  
 A closer examination of the pin-prick doctrine revealed 
that not only would it contribute to the rationalisation of jus ad 
bellum rules on self-defence, it would do so in a manner that was 
consistent with the restrictive approach to individual states’ uses 
of force. It conformed to the interests of individual states by 
allowing them to use force in situations where necessity 
compelled military responses, but which are outside the scope of 
traditional self-defence. It conformed to the collective security 
interest by relying, as the basis for the permissibility of use on 
force, upon information that was easily shareable and could be 
used to objectively determine legality of use of force. At the very 
least, the pin-prick doctrine does not represent greater leeway for 
states to use force than available under lex lata.  
 There are other ways to rationalise self-defence rules, 
such as pre-emptive self-defence, but this paper focused on the 
pin-prick doctrine because it represents a clear and easy ‘win’: it 
enjoys a high degree of support and carries a low risk of misuse. 
The recognition and incorporation of the pin-prick doctrine in 
international law represents not the rationalisation of jus ad 
bellum de lege lata, but the beginning of that process.   
